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Essay
Are You Recording This?:
Enforcement of Police Videotaping
MARTINA KITZMUELLER
Increasing numbers of police departments equip officers with
dashboard or body cameras. Advances in technology have made it easy for
police to create and preserve videos of their citizen encounters. Videos can
be important pieces of evidence; they may also serve to document police
misconduct or protect officers from false allegations. Yet too often, videos
are lost, destroyed, or never made, often depriving criminal defendants of
the only objective evidence in a case. When this happens, there is not
always a consequence to the prosecution. This Essay explores this problem
of enforcement by examining how different states are compelling law
enforcement to make and preserve videos through a combination of
legislation and judicial intervention.
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Are You Recording This?:
Enforcement of Police Videotaping
MARTINA KITZMUELLER∗
I. INTRODUCTION
In March 2014, a video showing Albuquerque police officers fatally
shooting a mentally ill homeless man camping in Albuquerque’s foothills
went viral on the news and Internet. In the video, recorded by an officer’s
helmet camera, police officers shoot James Boyd three times after he was
apparently about to surrender himself, then fire a beanbag gun and set
loose a police dog as Boyd lies on the ground.1 The shooting, which came
in the wake of more than twenty fatal shootings committed by A.P.D.
officers since 2010,2 caused widespread criticism, outrage, and protests of
the Albuquerque police force.3
It is difficult to imagine the same intense public reaction without the
very graphic images contained on the widely circulated video. In fact, one
might question whether the events surrounding James Boyd’s shooting
could ever have been reconstructed completely and accurately without
video.
Another fatal shooting less than one month after Boyd’s death
illustrated this point, as 19-year-old Mary Hawkes was shot three times by
an A.P.D. officer whose camera was not running.4 The lack of video raised
questions as to the circumstances of the shooting; questions that would not
necessarily have been resolved against the officer, had a video existed that
∗

Martina Kitzmueller is a research professor at the University of New Mexico School of Law and
a special assistant district attorney for the Bernalillo County District Attorney’s Office in Albuquerque.
She teaches a clinical course called DWI & Domestic Violence Prosecution in Practice. Prior to that
she was an assistant district attorney in the Violent Crimes Division in Albuquerque. She holds a
Magister Juris from the Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz, Austria (2002) and a J.D. from the University
of New Mexico (2006).
1
Dan McKay, Video: Camper Turning From Officers When Shot, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Mar. 22,
2014, 12:05 AM), http://www.abqjournal.com/372844/news/video-camper-turning-away.html.
2
Albuquerque Journal Special Report: DOJ Investigation of APD, ALBUQUERQUE J.,
http://www.abqjournal.com/apd-under-fire (last visited Sept. 18, 2014).
3
Bill Chappell, Albuquerque Protest of Fatal Police Shootings Turns Into Chaos, NPR (Mar. 31,
2014, 11:50 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/03/31/297163938/albuquerque-protestof-fatal-police-shootings-turns-into-chaos.
4
Patrick Lohmann, No Video of Mary Hawkes Shooting, APD Says, ALBUQUERQUE J. (May 22,
2014, 12:05 AM), http://www.abqjournal.com/404223/news/apd-no-lapel-video-of-mary-hawkesshooting-2.html.
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showed Hawkes pointing a gun at the officer, as the officer alleged.
The lapel video of yet another recent A.P.D shooting in fact proved
extremely helpful to the officer involved; when Officer Peter Romero shot
Robert Garcia in November 2013, the officer’s video showed Romero
commanding Garcia a total of nine times to drop his weapon, circling
around his police car as Garcia continued to approach him, and finally
shooting him once.5
Due in part to the mounting accusations of excessive use of force,
A.P.D. issued a standard operating procedure in May of 2012 requiring
officers to record all citizen encounters on newly acquired lapel cameras.6
Only a small amount of officers had previously carried video equipment on
their persons or in their vehicles,7 leaving it mostly to the their discretion if
they chose to record an encounter. Overnight, video recordings of all
A.P.D. investigations should have become the new norm.
But did they?
While officer-involved shootings generate the most attention, it is the
thousands of run-of-the-mill investigations—like Albuquerque’s many
DUI and domestic violence cases—that provide a more complete picture of
the level of police compliance with the new video policy. There have been
countless properly collected and preserved videos, but cases without a
video are frequent.8 There are many possible reasons for an absence of case
videos: equipment malfunction, limited storage capacity, viruses on A.P.D.
computers, failure to turn the camera on or to tag a video into evidence,
and inadvertent loss or destruction of the video.
When no video exists in a criminal case, what is the remedy? Should
the trial court dismiss the case or suppress any testimony regarding the
content of the video? Is there no sanction at all? How does the level of
culpability (by the officer or another agent for the prosecution) affect the
analysis, and what distinction exists between a video that was lost or
destroyed as opposed to a video that was never made? This Essay
5
See Dan McKay, APD Releases Video of Shooting by Officer, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Jan. 16, 2014,
5:59 AM), http://www.abqjournal.com/337394/news/apd-releases-video-of-shooting-by-officer.html
(reporting that Garcia lived; he had planned for an officer to shoot and kill him and carried a note in his
pocket with the words “thank you, officer”).
6
Jeff Proctor, APD to Expand Use of Cameras, ALBUQUERQUE J. (May 2, 2012, 8:48 AM),
http://www.abqjournal.com/103280/news/apd-to-expand-use-of-cameras.html.
7
See Memorandum from Acting Assistant Attorney Gen. Jocelyn Samuels, Office of the
Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div. & Acting U.S. Attorney Damon P. Martinez, Dist. of N.M.,
to Mayor Richard J. Berry, City of Albuquerque 25 n.37 (Apr. 10, 2014), available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/apd_findings_4-10-14.pdf (“Before using lapel
cameras in 2012, APD officers used belt tapes to capture audio of incidents.”).
8
Of the fifty-nine DUI and domestic violence cases handled by my students in the spring
semester of 2014, ten cases had an issue with video that was lost or destroyed, or where no video had
been taken at all. Lost and destroyed evidence is the most frequently raised defense issue in my
prosecution clinic.
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examines how various states have approached this issue through a
combination of legislation and judicial intervention.
II. THE HISTORY
A. Arizona v. Youngblood
1. The Case
The United States Supreme Court set the tone for modern
jurisprudence on destroyed evidence in 1988 when it decided Arizona v.
Youngblood.9 The defendant, Larry Youngblood, was convicted in an
Arizona trial court of child molestation, sexual assault, and kidnapping.10
The victim, a ten-year-old boy, was abducted by a stranger for a period of
about one and a half hours.11 Nine days after his abduction, the boy picked
out Larry Youngblood from a photographic lineup.12 Semen samples had
been collected on a swab from a rape kit, as well as on the child victim’s
clothing. The amount of semen collected through the rape kit was
insufficient to make a valid comparison with the defendant’s blood and
saliva.13 When, more than a year after the assault, a criminologist first
examined the boy’s clothing, which had not been refrigerated or frozen, he
too was unsuccessful in establishing the assailant’s identity.14 The
defendant’s case at trial rested on a defense of mistaken identity.15 Expert
witnesses testified that the defendant might have been completely
exonerated by the timely performance of tests on properly preserved semen
samples.16
The Arizona Court of Appeals overturned the jury’s conviction due to
the State’s failure to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence.17 The U.S.
Supreme Court reversed.18 The majority opinion drew a distinguishing line
between material exculpatory evidence, where the good or bad faith of the
state is irrelevant, and potentially useful evidence, “of which no more can
be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which
might have exonerated the defendant.”19
With regards to the latter, Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed the
9

488 U.S. 51 (1988).
Id. at 52.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 52–53.
13
Id. at 53–54.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 54.
17
State v. Youngblood, 734 P.2d 592, 596–97 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986), rev’d, 488 U.S. 51 (1988).
18
Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 59.
19
Id. at 57.
10
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Court’s holding that “unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the
part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not
constitute a denial of due process of law.”20
Applying this standard to the facts at hand, the Supreme Court did not
consider the semen samples material exculpatory evidence.21 Under its test
for potentially useful evidence, the Court found no bad faith and therefore
no due process violation, describing the failure by police to refrigerate the
clothing and to perform tests on the semen samples as negligent at worst.22
2. Youngblood Repercussions
Not surprisingly, Youngblood was met with significant criticism.23 In
his concurrence, Justice Stevens expressed one point of contention most
succinctly when he stated that “there may well be cases in which the
defendant is unable to prove that the State acted in bad faith but in which
the loss or destruction of evidence is nonetheless so critical to the defense
as to make a criminal trial fundamentally unfair.”24
Youngblood’s holding—that the loss of potentially exculpatory
evidence does not violate due process absent a showing of bad faith—was
destined to create controversy, especially in the context of lost DNA
evidence. The Supreme Court’s decision in Youngblood in 1988 came
several years before the Innocence Project was founded and decades before
the current count of over three hundred overturned convictions.25 In a
tragic twist, the case, which effectively barred defendants from fighting the
destruction of potentially exculpatory DNA evidence, rests on the
conviction of an innocent man.26 In 2000, advanced DNA analysis allowed
for retesting of the old samples, exonerating Larry Youngblood.27 Charges
against Mr. Youngblood were dismissed the same year, and the true
perpetrator was identified the following year through a hit in the national
convicted offender databases.28
Those hoping that the United States Supreme Court might change its

20

Id. at 58.
Id. at 57–58.
22
Id. at 58.
23
See, e.g., Norman C. Bay, Old Blood, Bad Blood, and Youngblood: Due Process, Lost
Evidence, and the Limits of Bad Faith, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 241, 259 (2008) (criticizing the
Youngblood decision for allowing instrumentalism to trump adjudicative fairness).
24
Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 61 (Stevens, J., concurring).
25
See INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Sept. 18, 2014)
(describing the basic mission of the Innocence Project and noting that over three hundred people have
been exonerated as of September, 2014).
26
Know the Cases: Larry Youngblood, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
Content/Larry_Youngblood.php (last visited Sept. 18, 2014).
27
Id.
28
Id.
21
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stance following these developments were disappointed. The Court
revisited the issue once in 2004, in Illinois v. Fisher.30 In Fisher, the
Supreme Court chose a case with remarkably uncontroversial facts31 to
confirm that Youngblood and the bad faith standard are still the law of the
land.32
3. Lost Recordings in the Wake of Youngblood
Youngblood triggered a wave of prosecution-friendly decisions in
cases where police lost or destroyed video and audio recordings.33 Courts
that followed Youngblood found that various manners of mishandling
police recordings did not violate due process under the bad faith standard.34
What constitutes bad faith? As used in cases involving destroyed
evidence, a finding of bad faith generally requires the state to “deliberately
destroy the evidence with the intent to deprive the defense of information;
that is, that the evidence was destroyed by, or at the direction of, a state
agent who intended to thwart the defense.”35
Herein lies the crux of the Youngblood dilemma for defense attorneys
29
See Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 549 (2004) (per curiam) (reaffirming Youngblood’s badfaith requirement).
30
Id. (holding that because the evidence was “potentially useful,” the Youngblood bad-faith
requirement is applicable).
31
Authorities had tested the cocaine at issue four times in two different labs, confirming the
substance to be cocaine; Chicago police destroyed the cocaine only after ten years according to normal
police procedure; the defendant had absconded to another state and remained a fugitive for over ten
years. Id. at 545–46.
32
Id. at 545–46, 549 (deciding that even though the State intentionally destroyed evidence after
the defendant had been a fugitive for over ten years, the Youngblood bad-faith requirement still applies
in Illinois).
33
See, e.g., State v. Gerhardt, 778 P.2d 1306, 1306–07, 1309 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (deciding that
accidentally destroying a videotape of the defendant did not substantially prejudice the defendant’s case
and thus did not warrant dismissal); Spaulding v. State, 394 S.E.2d 111, 111–12 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990)
(concluding that the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant after a videotape of him was
destroyed by police).
34
See, e.g., State v. Hulbert, 481 N.W.2d 329, 334–35 (Iowa 1992) (explaining that because the
deputy did not hinder the investigation and since he was unfamiliar with the contents on the tape, he did
not act in bad faith); State v. Steffes, 500 N.W.2d 608, 614 (N.D. 1993) (holding that there was no
evidence of bad faith when a sergeant erased a videotape thinking it was of no further value to the
investigation); People v. Jackson, 568 N.Y.S.2d 215, 216 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (holding that the
defendant’s rights were not violated when the videotape was accidentally erased because the defendant
failed to show how it depicted anything different from the testimony of police officers); Gerhardt, 778
P.2d at 1309 (deciding that the dismissal of a case is not warranted when a defendant fails to show that
the evidence was not preserved in bath faith); Spaulding, 394 S.E.2d at 111 (concluding that the police
did not act in bad faith when a videotape showing the defendant’s arrest was taped over after a certain
period of time); State v. Morales, 844 S.W.2d 885, 892 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (deciding that the
defendant’s due process rights were not violated when the taped interview was not preserved); Barre v.
State, 826 S.W.2d 722, 723, 725 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the defendant’s request to preserve
a tape recording of police communications during his arrest was properly overruled).
35
Steffes, 500 N.W.2d at 613 (emphasis added) (citing State v. Baldwin, 618 A.2d 513, 522
(Conn. 1993)).
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in video cases. Not only must all accidental loss or destruction fail under
this standard, but even cases where police deliberately destroy recordings
cannot pass unless the defense can show that the destruction was motivated
by an intent to thwart the defense. As a result, numerous decisions declined
to find due process violations where officers deliberately destroyed or
taped over recordings, oftentimes in accordance with internal police
procedure.36
In State v. Steffes,37 the defense filed a broad discovery request within
ten days of Steffes’s arrest.38 About three to four months later, the arresting
officer destroyed his audiotape by recording over it.39 When asked why he
erased the tape, the officer explained that he needed a fresh tape and that he
had assumed that the case was resolved.40 The North Dakota Supreme
Court analogized the officer’s failure to preserve the tape to the State’s
failure to preserve clothing and semen samples properly in Youngblood.41
Declining to find bad faith, the Court stated,
[w]hether [the officer’s] action could be termed reckless,
intentional, negligent, or merely that of following or failing
to follow regular police procedure, is open to question.
But . . . the evidentiary standard necessary to prove bad faith
by the state with regard to the destruction or loss of evidence
is quite high.42
Other cases deal specifically with the issue of destruction according to
police procedure. In Barre v. State,43 the Texas Court of Appeals noted that
“[w]here evidence is destroyed in good faith and in accord with the normal
practice of the police . . . there is no due process violation.”44 Later that
year, the Texas Court of Appeals found no due process violation when an

36
See, e.g., Steffes, 500 N.W.2d at 613–14 (N.D. 1993) (contending that while the sergeant could
have been acting recklessly when erasing the tapes while following police procedure, he did not act in
bad faith); Spaulding, 394 S.E.2d at 111–12 (showing that video tapes that are involved in criminal
investigations are kept for a certain period of time and then are eventually taped over, so the defendant
was not entitled to have the testimony of the officers dismissed); Barre, 826 S.W.2d 722, 723 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1992) (noting that re-using video tapes of dispatch communications is part of an officer’s normal
course of business); Morales, 844 S.W.2d at 887, 890 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (contending that it is
regular police practice to reuse video tapes if a case is thought to be dismissed).
37
Steffes, 500 N.W.2d at 608.
38
Id. at 610.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 613.
41
Id. (citing Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 53–54 (1988)).
42
Id. at 613–14.
43
826 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
44
Id. at 724 (citing Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58); see California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488
(1984) (concluding that the police’s failure to retain breath samples in a criminal investigation did not
violate the Constitution).
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officer destroyed the defendant’s recorded statement by taping over it.45
The officer incorrectly assumed (without consulting the District Attorney’s
Office) that the case would be dismissed after the victim’s mother
indicated that she wanted to drop charges, and that department policy
called for the reuse of tapes not being held in evidence.46 Similarly, the
Georgia Court of Appeals found no bad faith where the videotape of a
defendant’s DUI investigation was destroyed prior to trial, because the
officer testified that it was standard practice to keep videotapes for a
certain period of time and then tape over them.47
These cases from the early 1990s share a near impossibility of
establishing bad faith in states following Youngblood. So long as an agency
maintained a policy of allowing for the destruction of recordings, through
reuse or destruction after a certain period of time, such policies were given
deference even when police showed little concern for the fact that the
criminal case was pending. Questions concerning the predictability of these
policies resulting in the destruction of evidence were apparently not
considered.
4. States Deviating from Youngblood
Not all states chose to follow Youngblood.48 States rejecting a strict
bad faith standard instead adopted balancing tests to determine due process
violations arising from the deprivation of evidence. Connecticut and New
Mexico are two such states.
Several years before Youngblood, the New Mexico Supreme Court, in
State v. Chouinard,49 adopted a three-part test, asking: (1) whether the state
breached a duty or intentionally deprived the defendant of evidence; (2)
whether the evidence was material; and (3) whether the defendant suffered
prejudice.50 Proving bad faith is not required, and the defendant must show
materiality and prejudice in cases where the state shows that it did not act
in bad faith when it lost evidence.51 Even if the three-part test is met,
dismissal is not mandated. The trial court has a choice between two
alternatives, depending on its assessment of materiality and prejudice:
“[e]xclusion of all evidence which the lost evidence might have
45

State v. Morales, 844 S.W.2d 885, 892 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
Id. at 887.
47
Spaulding v. State, 394 S.E.2d 111, 111 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
48
For lists of states following and rejecting Youngblood and a comparison of state approaches,
see Daniel R. Dinger, Note, Should Lost Evidence Mean a Lost Chance to Prosecute?: State Rejections
of the United States Supreme Court Decision in Arizona v. Youngblood, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 329, 343–
53 (2000) (discussing a variety of approaches to the bad-faith requirement in different states).
49
634 P.2d 680, 680–81 (N.M. 1981).
50
Id. at 683; see State v. Redd, 308 P.3d 1000, 1005 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013) (noting that New
Mexico courts generally follow Chouinard’s three-part test for deciding the outcome of cases involving
violation of discovery orders).
51
Chouinard, 634 P.2d at 684–85.
46
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impeached, or admission with full disclosure of the loss and its relevance
and import.”52
Connecticut’s balancing test will be discussed later in this Essay.
III. THE ROLE OF VIDEO IN LOST EVIDENCE CASES
Lost video recordings generally do not hold the crucial power of DNA
evidence. Videos are rarely capable of sending a person to prison or saving
an innocent man from death row. While videos such as the one recording
the shooting of James Boyd attract media attention, the average police
video shows a person counting incorrectly or failing the heel-to-toe
component of a DUI field sobriety test.53 Perhaps this explains the almost
casual attitude that courts have long taken towards recordings destroyed by
police. However, recent years have brought signs of change. The following
are factors that likely contributed to the change in attitudes.
A. The Evolving Role of DUI
A significant portion of videotaping case law and legislation applies
specifically to DUI.54 The criminal offense of driving under the influence
of alcohol or drugs has undergone great changes in punishment, social
stigma, and related consequences, such as employment. Where a few
decades ago many jurisdictions treated DUI no worse than a traffic ticket,
DUI offenders today, depending on their state, face stiff fines, DUI
school,55 suspension of their driving privileges,56 supervised probation, an
ignition interlock in their vehicle,57 potential incarceration, sometimes even
52
Id. at 684. The New Mexico courts confirmed the continued application of Chouinard and the
three-part test shortly after Youngblood in State v. Bartlett, 789 P.2d 627, 628 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990)
and State v. Riggs, 838 P.2d 975, 978 (N.M. 1992), and most recently in State v. Redd, 308 P.3d 1000,
1005 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013).
53
According to a survey of prosecutors, one of “the most common and effective uses of video
evidence ha[s] been in the prosecution of: driving under the influence (DUIs) . . . .” INT’L ASS’N OF
CHIEFS OF POLICE, THE IMPACT OF VIDEO EVIDENCE ON MODERN POLICING app. ii–1, available at
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/ric/Publications/video_evidence.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2014).
54
E.g., S.C. C ODE ANN . § 56-5-2953(A) (West 2013) (requiring that a violator’s conduct
and breath test be video recorded); City of Greer v. Humble, 742 S.E.2d 15, 16 (S.C. Ct. App. 2013)
(attempting to dismiss a DUI charge based on an officer’s failure to use video recording).
55
See Robert Scott, Using Critical Pedagogy to Connect Prison Education and Prison
Abolitionism, 33 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 401, 403 n.8 (2014) (“[M]any states have DUI School and
other ‘courses’ that result in a reduced or waived prison sentence . . . .”); see, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §
56-5-2953(H) (West 2013) (“A person convicted of [driving under the influence] . . . must enroll in and
successfully complete an Alcohol and Drug Safety Action Program . . . .”).
56
See Drunk Driving Laws, GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY ASS’N, http://www.ghsa.org/html/
stateinfo/laws/impaired_laws.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2014) (“42 states . . . have administrative
license suspension (ALS) on the first offense.”).
57
See Status of State Ignition Interlock Laws, MADD, http://www.madd.org/drunkdriving/ignition-interlocks/status-of-state-ignition.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2014) (showing that a
total of thirty-nine states mandate an ignition interlock for first time offenders if BAC exceeds .18).
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58

public shaming and, depending on their employment, loss of their
careers. Unlike other types of criminal charges brought predominantly
against the economically disadvantaged, DUI arrests are spread across the
population,59 including individuals willing and able to pour significant
resources into his or her defense. Consequently, fighting a charge of DUI is
now of great importance to many defendants.
Up until a possible breath or blood alcohol test, the standard DUI
investigation is based entirely on the officer’s observations of the suspect’s
driving, statements, speech, balance, demeanor, and ability to perform field
sobriety tests. In view of this fact, the existence of a video documenting the
investigation can be crucial to a defense attorney intent on impeaching the
officer.
B. The Advance in Technology
Twenty years ago, making a recording meant creating a bulky tape.
Several cases discussed previously featured tapes that were reused by
taping over old recordings. This must indeed have appeared to be the best
solution short of every decent-sized police department housing thousands
of tapes, a problem of both cost and storage. Digital recorders are now a
fraction of the cost they used to be and exist in all types and variations:
dash cameras, lapel cameras, helmet cameras, digital audio recorders, et
cetera. Digital files can be easily stored and duplicated on compact discs,
flash drives, hard drives, and now even in a “cloud.”60

See also Michael L. Rich, Limits on the Perfect Preventive State, 46 CONN. L. REV. 883, 890–92 (2014)
(discussing technologies that prevent drunk driving).
58
See Dan McKay, Will Shame Stop DWI Offenders?, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Feb. 22, 2006),
http://abqjournal.com/news/metro/435614metro02-22-06.htm (discussing the potential for the
legislature to “publish the names and photographs of people who are convicted of drunken driving”).
Pursuant to the City of Albuquerque Code of Ordinances, Chapter 11, Article 13, titled “Publication of
Persons Convicted of Driving Under the Influence,” the names and photographs of all persons
convicted of DUI in Bernalillo County are published “in print form in a newspaper of general
circulation in the City of Albuquerque.” ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., CODE § 11–13–1(A) (2013).
59
See MICHAEL C. TILLOTSON & JEFF MARTIN, VA. PRAC., VA. DUI LAW § 9:1 (2013) (“DUI is
neither a poor man’s crime nor a rich man’s crime. The offense does not favor one gender over the
other, nor is one race more likely than any other to commit this offense. DUI is truly an equal
opportunity offense.”). In addition, courts apply a special causation requirement in some DUI cases.
See Eric A. Johnson, Wrongful-Aspect Overdetermination: The Scope-of-the-Risk Requirement in
Drunk-Driving Homicide, 46 CONN. L. REV. 601, 607–08 (2013).
60
See Neal Ungerleider, Taser’s New Police Glasses-Cam Lets Citizens See What Cops See, FAST
CO. (Feb. 21, 2012, 12:50 AM), http://www.fastcompany.com/1817960/tasers-new-police-glasses-camlets-citizens-see-what-cops-see (discussing a product sold to police departments that includes the ability
of cloud storage of files). The Albuquerque Police Department began using evidence in the cloud in
April 2013. Press Release, TASER, Albuquerque Police Department Deploys 75 AXON Flex Systems
(Mar. 28, 2013), available at http://investor.taser.com/releasedetail .cfm?ReleaseID=751864.
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C. A Greater Demand for Police Accountability – Lessons from Ferguson
The recent events in Ferguson, Missouri showcased the need for police
video regulations better than any other event. Without a doubt, the vastly
differing accounts of the circumstances surrounding Michael Brown’s
death, combined with what many perceived as an unconditional
willingness by the St. Louis Chief of Police to believe the officer over
other witnesses, fueled the fire of the protests that followed.61 For days, the
streets of Ferguson were filled with people demanding the name of the
shooter and a better investigation into Michael Brown’s killing.62 They
demanded transparency and accountability; each day their rage grew as
they found neither.
The vastly differing versions of the story of the shooting did something
else: they propelled the topic of body cameras into the national spotlight.63
Four days after the shooting, an online activist from Georgia created a
petition on the White House’s “We the People” page, calling for all police
to wear cameras, which easily surpassed the 100,000-signature mark in less
than one week.64 How differently would the events in Ferguson have
played out, had the officer worn a camera? One cannot speculate in which
direction a video recording would have swayed the judgment that Ferguson
residents passed on Michael Brown’s shooter. However, it is a safe
assumption that a police department that makes its officers record all
encounters and that uses videos to hold officers accountable would likely
not have incited the same public rage as the Ferguson Police Department
did in the wake of Michael Brown’s shooting.
61
See Frances Robles & Julie Bosman, Missouri Shooting Victim Was Hit at Least 6 Times, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 18, 2014, at A1 (contrasting the police department’s account characterizing the shooting
as a “physical struggle” between Brown and the officer with an eye-witness’s account characterizing
the shooting as “racial profiling and police aggression”).
62
See Julie Bosman & Erik Eckholm, Anonymity in Police Shooting Fuels Frustration, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 14, 2014, at A1 (discussing nightly civilian protests requesting the release of details of the
investigation including the name of the police officer who shot Brown). Cf. Nicolas J. Johnson,
Firearms Policy and the Black Community: An Assessment of the Modern Orthodoxy, 45 CONN. L.
REV. 1492, 1497–1532 (2013) (describing the historical experience of African-Americans and firearms,
and noting that like “any racist terrorist the state was simply a menace.”).
63
See Barbara Ortutay, After Ferguson: Calls for Police ‘Body Cameras’, AP (Aug. 23, 2014,
3:02 AM), http://www.apnewsarchive.com/2014/In-Ferguson-fallout,-calls-grow-for-police-to-wear‘body-cameras’-_-but-with-caveats/id-b84d0fabf6fa472cb3a6641a52655a7b (discussing a petition
submitted to President Obama seeking the creation of a bill that would require police officers to wear
body cameras).
64
See Mike Brown Law. Requires All State, County, and Local Police to Wear a Camera, THE
WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 13, 2014), https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/petition/mike-brown-law-requires-allstate-county-and-local-police-wear-camera/8tlS5czf (“Create a bill, sign into law, and set aside funds to
require all state, county, and local police, to wear a camera.”); see also Colby Itkowitz, Michael Brown
Petition Has 100,000 Signatures; the White House Must Respond, WASH. POST (Aug. 20, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/in-the-loop/wp/2014/08/20/michael-brown-petition-has100000-signatures-the-white-house-must-respond/ (discussing the petition).

2014]

ARE YOU RECORDING THIS?

179

There is another painful point for speculation. Introducing mandatory
recording procedures in a police force leads to an immediate decrease in
excessive force claims.65 Would Officer Darren Wilson have shot Michael
Brown at least six times if he had known he was being recorded? It is
impossible to answer that question. The mere fact that it poses itself speaks
volumes.
Concern over police misconduct is neither new nor unique. Whether it
is fear of a Rodney King style beating, garden variety neglect, or
incompetence, the public appreciates knowing that law enforcement
officers are held responsible for being the professional servants of the
community for which they took an oath. This factor ties closely into the
technological advances discussed immediately above. Not only has
technology evolved for law enforcement, it has evolved for everyone. A
society where almost anyone can make a video at a moment’s notice with
the tap of a cell phone button is less willing to indulge its police officers in
claiming an inability to do the same.
D. Protection of Police Officers from False Allegations
On the other hand, the many conscientious police officers in our
communities have an interest in recording their citizen encounters to
combat frivolous claims of misconduct.66 For example, the video that
showed Albuquerque Police Officer Romero backing away and directing a
total of nine commands at the man advancing at him with a raised gun,
nipped in the bud any allegation of misconduct in a more powerful manner
than any verbal explanation could have.67
IV. THE PROBLEM OF ENFORCEMENT IN VIDEO CASES
This Section examines the obstacles to the efficient enforcement of
recording requirements and the approaches different states have taken to
overcome them. These include statutes governing the videotaping of police
investigations and court sanctions for mishandled recordings. Internal
police regulations may also play a role.

65
See Randall Stross, Wearing a Badge, and a Video Camera, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2013, at BU4
(noting that a study by Cambridge University, in cooperation with the Rialto, California Police
Department, found that complaints filed against officers declined by eighty-eight percent within the
first year of introducing body cameras).
66
See AS MORE POLICE WEAR CAMERAS, POLICY QUESTIONS ARISE (Nat’l Pub. Radio broadcast
Nov. 7, 2011) (transcript on file with LEXIS) (discussing the use of cameras to assure both officer
accountability and protection from false accusations).
67
Dan McKay, ADP Releases Video of Shooting by Officer, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Jan. 16, 2014
12:05 AM), http://www.abqjournal.com/337394/news/apd-releases-video-of-shooting-by-officer.html.
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A. Introduction: Failure to Preserve vs. Failure to Collect
Every problem with lost, destroyed, or uncollected evidence falls into
one of two categories: failure to preserve or failure to collect. The
distinction plays a crucial role in determining what law applies and if a
court may sanction the prosecution.
Regardless of whether state courts followed Youngblood or developed
their own balancing test, every state in the nation follows Brady v.
Maryland,68 insofar as the prosecution in every state possesses the duty to
preserve and disclose material evidence collected by its agents. However, a
less stringent duty exists to collect evidence not yet in the state’s
possession.69
New Mexico, again, serves as an example here: “Usually, the failure to
gather evidence is not the same as the failure to preserve evidence, and that
the State generally has no duty to collect particular evidence at the crime
scene.”70 The New Mexico Supreme Court in State v. Ware71 noted that
this rule is not absolute: “We do not condone shoddy and inadequate police
investigation procedures at the expense of a criminal defendant’s right to a
fair trial. In some cases, the State’s failure to gather evidence may amount
to suppression of material evidence.”72 The Court then adopted a two-part
test for deciding whether to sanction the State for police failure to gather:
the evidence must be material to the defendant’s defense, and there must
be bad faith. “If the trial court determines that the failure to collect the
evidence was done in bad faith, in an attempt to prejudice the defendant’s
case, then the trial court may order the evidence suppressed.”73 It is thus
here, in the context of failure to gather rather than failure to preserve, that
we encounter Youngblood’s notoriously difficult bad faith standard in New
Mexico.
When a student in my prosecution clinic notices the absence of a video
in a case file and all attempts to procure the video turn out to be unfruitful,
the next step for that student is to contact the officer and inquire why there
is no video: did he or she not make one at all, or was a video made and
subsequently lost or destroyed? The first scenario falls under the failure to
collect and is governed by Ware; the latter would be failure to preserve
under Chouinard. Because of the different standards, the prosecution finds
itself in a more promising situation if the officer did not attempt to make a
video at all, rather than if a video was made but accidentally lost or
destroyed.
68

373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
E.g., State v. Ware, 881 P.2d 679, 683 (N.M. 1994) (citations omitted).
70
Id.
71
881 P.2d 679 (N.M. 1994).
72
Id. at 684 (citations omitted).
73
Id. at 685.
69
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As a matter of public policy, this result is problematic. If a video lost
to one of many possible technical or human errors means a greater risk of
dismissal than not making a recording at all, this sends a questionable
message to law enforcement. Example A: an officer makes a recording that
becomes lost when it is accidentally tagged into evidence under an
incorrect case number. Example B: an officer has a camera attached to his
uniform but makes no attempt to use it. We intuitively suspect that the first
officer acted in better faith than the second. Yet the State has little to fear
in Example B, unless the defense can prove that the failure to collect was
done in an attempt to prejudice the defendant’s case; a standard that is
impossible to meet.74
B. Video Recording Statutes
Few states have statutes requiring police to acquire and use video
cameras. This Section takes a closer look at two such states—South
Carolina and Illinois—for a comparison of the different outcomes
depending on the statutory provisions and the courts that interpret them.
1. South Carolina’s DUI Videotaping Statute
The South Carolina Legislature solved the problem of video
enforcement through its enactment of section 56-5-2953, titled Incident
Site and Breath Test Site Video Recording.75 Section 56-5-2953 controls
the videotaping of all persons investigated for driving under the influence
of alcohol or drugs. The statute gives detailed directions of what must be
recorded and when a recording must commence.76
Subsection (A)(1)(a) governs video recording at the incident site:
recordings must begin no later than the activation of the officer’s blue
lights and must include field sobriety tests, arrests, and Miranda
warnings.77
Subsection (A)(2) governs video recording at the breath test site:
recordings must include the entire breath test procedure and an advisement
to the person arrested that he is being video recorded and that he has the
right to refuse the test.78 It must show the person taking or refusing the test
74
In Albuquerque, one resourceful defense attorney has been successful in establishing bad faith
by showing a pattern of consistent failure to use the camera by an individual officer. She would do so
through review of all reports by that officer over a certain time period, revealing an unusually high
occurrence of claims of camera malfunction, camera loss, etc.
75
S.C. C ODE ANN . § 56-5-2953 (2006 & Supp. 2013).
76
Id.
77
S.C. C ODE ANN . § 56-5-2953(A)(1)(a) (2006 & Supp. 2013). In addition to these three
requirements of videos under § 56-5-2953(A)(1)(A), an amendment proposed in April 2014 has
requested that video recordings also include an audio recording. H.B. 4476, 120th Leg., 2d Reg.
Sess. (S.C. 2013).
78
S.C. C ODE ANN . § 56-5-2953(A)(2)(a) (2006 & Supp. 2013).
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and the actions of the breath test operator while conducting the test.79
Further, if physically possible, the video must include the person’s conduct
during the required twenty-minute pre-test waiting period.80
Subsection (B) contains detailed guidelines for failure to produce the
video. Such failure is not a ground for dismissal in and of itself if the
officer submits a sworn affidavit certifying that the video recording
equipment was in an inoperable condition, stating what reasonable efforts
have been made to maintain the equipment in an operable condition, and
certifying that there was no other operable breath test facility available in
the county, or, in the alternative, submits a sworn affidavit that it was
physically impossible to produce the video because the person needed
emergency medical treatment, or exigent circumstances existed.81 Courts
are further permitted to consider any other valid reason for failure to
produce the video based upon the totality of the circumstances; likewise,
the defendant may offer evidence related to the officer’s failure to produce
the recording.82
The statute also forbids destruction of a video prior to termination of
any related legal proceedings.83
a. Resulting Case Law
Following passage of South Carolina’s prescriptive recording statute, it
remained to be seen if the State’s appellate courts would interpret it as
narrowly as the statute suggests. They did so.
The South Carolina Supreme Court swiftly rejected arguments by the
prosecution that a violation of the videotaping statute should not result in
dismissal without a showing of prejudice to the defendant.84 South
Carolina appellate courts have “strictly construed section 56-5-2953 and
found that a law enforcement agency’s failure to comply with these
provisions is fatal to the prosecution of a DUI case.”85
In State v. Johnson,86 the arresting officer had turned on the video
camera at the breath machine when he realized that the machine was not
functioning. He moved the defendant to a different machine but failed to
79

S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-2953(A)(2)(b) (2006 & Supp. 2013).
S.C. C ODE ANN . § 56-5-2953(A)(2)(c) (2006 & Supp. 2013).
81
S.C. C ODE ANN . § 56-5-2953(B) (2006 & Supp. 2013). Under the proposed amendment to
§ 56-5-2953, discussed supra note 77, the requirements of § 56-5-2953(B) would be extended to
audio recordings as well. H.B. 4476, 120th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2013).
82
See id. (citing S.C. C ODE ANN . § 56-5-2953(B) (2006 & Supp. 2013)).
83
S.C. C ODE ANN . § 56-5-2953(C) (2006 & Supp. 2013).
84
See City of Rock Hill v. Suchenski, 646 S.E.2d 879, 880–81 (S.C. 2007) (concluding that a
dismissal of charges may result if the violation occurs, even without a showing of prejudice to the
defendant).
85
Town of Mount Pleasant v. Roberts, 713 S.E.2d 278, 285 (S.C. 2011) (citing Suchenski, 646
S.E.2d at 881) (citations omitted).
86
720 S.E.2d 516 (S.C. Ct. App. 2011).
80
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activate the video camera for the second machine, so that Johnson could be
heard but not seen taking the breath test.87 The officer did not submit an
affidavit regarding the videotape.88 The magistrate court suppressed the
breath test but denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss.89 The South
Carolina Supreme Court reversed the magistrate, finding unexcused
noncompliance with section 56-5-2953, and it dismissed the charges.90
In Town of Mount Pleasant v. Roberts,91 the South Carolina Supreme
Court addressed the question of whether the videotaping statute applies to
police units not equipped with a video camera.92 The arresting officer
executed an affidavit stating that his vehicle had not been equipped with a
videotaping device.93 Section 56-5-2953(D) places responsibility for
purchasing and supplying all videotaping equipment for use in law
enforcement vehicles on the Department of Public Safety.94 The Town
argued that it was not bound by the statute if DPS failed to supply its
police force with a sufficient number of cameras.95 Again, the Supreme
Court strictly construed the videotaping statute and dismissed the charges
based on unexcused noncompliance, noting that “the Town’s prolonged
failure to equip its patrol vehicles with video cameras defeats the intent of
the Legislature.”96
Similarly, in another case, an affidavit that the video recording
equipment in an officer’s vehicle was inoperable at the time of the
defendant’s arrest was held to be deficient on its face, where it failed to
state which reasonable efforts had been made to maintain the video
equipment in an operable condition.97
The prosecution briefly got a break in Murphy v. State,98 when the
Court of Appeals held that an officer’s dashboard videotape device did not
violate the statute—even though the video did not capture a full view of
87

Id. at 520–21.
Id. at 518.
89
Id. at 521.
90
Id. at 521–22.
91
713 S.E.2d 278 (S.C. 2011).
92
Id. at 285.
93
Id. at 280.
94
See S.C. C ODE ANN . § 56-5-2953(D) (2006 & Supp. 2013) (“The Department of Public
Safety is responsible for purchasing, maintaining, and supplying all videotaping equipment for
use in all law enforcement vehicles used for traffic enforcement. The Department of Public
Safety also is responsible for monitoring all law enforcement vehicles used for traffic
enforcement to ensure proper maintenance of videotaping equipment.”).
95
See Roberts, 713 S.E.2d at 280–81 (positing the town’s argument that the statute did not take
effect until the Department of Public Safety supplied the town police department with video cameras).
96
Id. at 287.
97
See City of Greer v. Humble, 742 S.E.2d 15, 18 (S.C. Ct. App. 2013) (concluding that the city’s
failure to list which reasonable efforts were exerted to maintain the video equipment in good condition
violated the statutory requirements).
98
709 S.E.2d 685 (S.C. Ct. App. 2011).
88
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the defendant’s field sobriety tests—noting that the video need only record
the accused’s conduct.99 However, section 56-5-2953 was amended in
2009 to expressly require the recording of field sobriety tests,100 and the
Court of Appeals confirmed in State v. Gordon101 that Murphy was
superseded. The officer in Gordon recorded Gordon’s field sobriety tests,
but Gordon’s head was cut off during administration of the horizontal gaze
nystagmus test (a test examining eye movement).102 The Court affirmed
the lower court’s finding that the subject’s head must be shown during the
test in order for that sobriety test to be recorded:103 “Because of the
purpose of the videotaping to create direct evidence of the arrest, if the
actual tests cannot be seen on the recording, the requirement is
pointless.”104
The South Carolina Supreme Court very recently addressed a similar
issue in State v. Sawyer.105 The video showed the officer reading Sawyer
his Miranda rights and the implied consent information.106 Sawyer signed
the related forms. However, the audio device in the subject test area did not
function.107 It appears that the State was unaware of the audio malfunction
for several months.108 In a 3-2 opinion, the Court held that a breath test site
video without audio recording of Miranda warnings did not meet the
requirements of section 56-5-2953(A), and it affirmed the suppression of
the video and breath test evidence.109 Chief Justice Toal wrote the dissent,
urging for a harmless error analysis.110 According to the dissent, exclusion
of evidence is typically reserved for constitutional violations, unless there
is prejudice to the defendant.111 Here, the dissent believed that Sawyer was
not prejudiced by the video recording’s lack of audio.112 Chief Justice Toal
further stated, “[i]n my view, nothing in section 56-5-2953 mandates
suppression of a defective video recording, nor has this Court ever
interpreted the statute as requiring strict compliance for admission of a
video recording, as the majority asserts. Defects in evidence generally do
99

Id.
S.C. C ODE ANN . § 56-5-2953(A)(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 2012).
101
759 S.E.2d 755, 758 (S.C. Ct. App. 2014).
102
Id. at 756.
103
Id. at 758.
104
Id.
105
Appellate Case No. 2011-201206, 2014 WL 4214429, at *1 (S.C. Aug. 27, 2014).
106
Id. at *1.
107
Id.
108
See id. at *2 (explaining that the circuit court judge held that no exigent circumstances existed
because the state did not know about the audio malfunction for months).
109
See id. at *4 (holding that failure to comply with the statute’s terms renders the evidence
inadmissible).
110
Id. at *4–6 (Toal, C.J., dissenting).
111
Id. at *5.
112
Id.
100
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113

not affect admissibility.” The dissent in Sawyer deserves mention as the
only recent judicial step away from the exceedingly strict construction of
section 56-5-2953.
The South Carolina Supreme Court based its strict interpretation of the
statute, at least in part, on its unique application to a DUI arrest:
[I]t is instructive that the Legislature has not mandated
videotaping in any other criminal context. Despite the
potential significance of videotaping oral confessions, the
Legislature has not required the State to do so. By requiring a
law enforcement agency to videotape a DUI arrest, the
Legislature clearly intended strict compliance with the
provisions of section 56-5-2953 and, in turn, promulgated a
severe sanction for noncompliance.114
2. The Illinois State Police Act
In 2008, the Illinois legislature passed section 30(b) of the State Police
Act, titled Patrol Vehicles with In-Car Video Recording Cameras.115
Section 30(b) required the Department of State Police to install in-car
video camera recording equipment in all patrol vehicles by June 1, 2009.116
The Act provides that “[a]ny enforcement stop resulting from a suspected
violation of the Illinois Vehicle Code shall be video and audio
recorded.”117 Section 30(f) requires the State Police to retain recordings for
at least ninety days.118 In addition, recordings made by any agency “as a
part of an arrest” or which “are deemed [to be] evidence in any criminal,
civil, or administrative proceeding,” cannot be destroyed until final
disposition and a court order.119 The officer operating a patrol vehicle is
required to report “any technical difficulties, failures, or problems” with
the recording equipment to his commander, who “shall make every
reasonable effort to correct and repair” the equipment and shall “determine
if it is in the public interest to permit the use of the patrol vehicle.”120
a. People v. Kladis
The most cited Illinois Supreme Court decision tackling the issue of
lost video recordings, People v. Kladis,121 did not base its holding on the
videotaping statute. The defense made a discovery request for the officer’s
113

Id. (citations omitted).
Town of Mount Pleasant v. Roberts, 713 S.E.2d 278, 286 (S.C. 2011).
115
20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 2610/30(b) (West 2013).
116
Id.
117
20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 2610/30(e) (West 2013).
118
20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 2610/30(f) (West 2013).
119
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14–3(h–15) (West 2013).
120
20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 2610/30(h) (West 2013).
121
960 N.E.2d 1104 (Ill. 2011).
114
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dash-camera video five days after the defendant’s arrest. When the
prosecutor forwarded the request to the police department, following the
first court date, it was discovered that the recording had been destroyed
earlier that same day in accordance with the department’s policy of
purging all videos after thirty days.123 The trial court effectively suppressed
any testimony—as portrayed in the video—regarding the events leading up
to the defendant being placed in the squad car.124
Illinois is among the states following Youngblood and the bad faith test
in lost evidence due process analysis.125 The Illinois Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court deftly sidestepped Youngblood by defining the issue as a
discovery violation governed by the relevant Illinois Supreme Court
Rule,126 rather than a due process violation.127 Rejecting the State’s
position that videos did not constitute discovery as previously defined by
the court, the Illinois Supreme Court declared that “routine video recording
of traffic stops has now become an integral part of those encounters,
objectively documenting what takes place by capturing the conduct and the
words of both parties[,]” and clarified that video recordings are
discoverable in misdemeanor DUI cases.128 Both courts upheld the sanction
imposed by the trial court.129
In its opinion, the Supreme Court also referred to the recent legislative
amendment to the State Police Act.130 In its discussion of legislative intent,
the Court explained the use of recordings to both the State and the
defendant, emphasizing that video recordings have the power to cement a
defendant’s guilt as well as support the defense, assisting the trier of fact in
either instance.131
The court also found significant the later provision extending the
122

Id. at 1106.
Id.
124
Id. at 1108.
125
See, e.g., People v. Sutherland, 860 N.E.2d 178, 213–16 (Ill. 2006) (applying Youngblood for
lost evidence); People v. Pecoraro, 677 N.E.2d 875, 886–87 (Ill. 1997) (discussing and applying
Youngblood); In re C.J., 652 N.E.2d 315, 319–20 (Ill. 1995) (analyzing the defendant’s claim of due
process violations for failure to preserve evidence under the Youngblood bad faith test).
126
See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 415(g)(i) (West 2004) (“If at any time during the course of the
proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with an
applicable discovery rule or an order issued pursuant thereto, the court may order such party to permit
the discovery of material and information not previously disclosed, grant a continuance, exclude such
evidence, or enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.”).
127
See Kladis, 960 N.E.2d at 1109–11 (analyzing whether the state’s actions constituted a
discovery violation); see also People v. Kladis, 934 N.E.2d 58, 63–65 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (comparing
the two ways in which a discovery violation can be analyzed, then determining that a due process
analysis need not occur because the state found a discovery violation independent of due process).
128
Kladis, 960 N.E.2d at 1109–11.
129
Id. at 1113; People v. Kladis, 934 N.E.2d 58, 75 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
130
Kladis, 960 N.E.2d at 1111.
131
Id. at 1111–12.
123
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ninety-day preservation requirement to the full duration of any criminal,
civil, or administrative proceeding.132
It is important to note that unlike the South Carolina courts, who
founded their strict enforcement exclusively on the South Carolina
videotaping statute, the Illinois Supreme Court in Kladis discussed the
State Police Act merely as support for its decision rather than its basis.133
That basis lay firmly in Supreme Court Rule 415(g).134
b. People v. Borys
Two years later, the Illinois Court of Appeals dealt more explicitly
with the State Police Act in People v. Borys.135 Similar to the facts in South
Carolina’s Town of Mt. Pleasant v. Roberts, the defendant was arrested for
DUI by an Illinois State Trooper whose assigned patrol vehicle was not
equipped with a video camera.136 Following her conviction by the trial
court, the defendant appealed, contending that the alleged statutory
violation of section 30 of the State Police Act “should be treated in the
same manner as a discovery violation.”137
The court disagreed, stating “[n]othing in the plain and unambiguous
language of section 30 of the Act indicates that an officer’s testimony
concerning a traffic stop is inadmissible if his patrol vehicle does not have
the required video recording equipment.”138 The court placed importance
on section 30(h), permitting the use of a patrol vehicle without video
equipment so long as the lack of recording equipment had been
documented and a superior officer determined that using the vehicle was in
the public’s interest.139
132
See id. at 1111 (citation omitted) (“[T]he General Assembly clarified and broadened the
production and preservation safeguards for police recordings. It established the general rule that when
any law enforcement agency makes an in-squad video and audio recording . . . that recording shall be
retained for a minimum period of 90 days . . . . We note that this heightened protection is triggered
either where, as here, an arrest occurred or where the recording is considered to be evidence in any
criminal, civil or administrative proceeding. Significantly, the General Assembly placed no restriction
on this latter factor, encompassing all proceedings.”).
133
Id. at 1111 (citing 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 2610/30 (West 2008)). Of course Section 30(b)
of the State Police Act is limited in its application to state police officers, not officers of other police
departments such as the Northlake police officer in Kladis. See 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 2610/1
(West 2008) (noting that the “Department,” as used in the State Police Act, refers to the State Police
Department).
134
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 415(g) (West 2014).
135
995 N.E.2d 499 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
136
Id. at 502.
137
Id. at 505 (citing 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 2610/30 (West 2008)).
138
Id. at 506 (citation omitted).
139
Id. at 504–506 (citing 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 2610/30(h) (West 2008)). Extending the
language of section 30(h), particularly of “technical difficulties, failures, or problems with the in-car
video camera recording equipment,” 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 2610/30(h) (West 2008) (emphasis
added), to situations where no video equipment was installed at all, rather than to technical problems
with existing equipment, does appear to be a stretch for a court intent on plain language interpretation.
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The Court of Appeals then turned to the mandatory-directory
dichotomy to determine whether the requirements of section 30 are
mandatory or directory provisions.140 The mandatory-directory dichotomy
determines whether failure to comply with a procedural requirement has
the effect of invalidating the governmental action.141 Statutes where the
legislative intent dictates a consequence for failure to comply are deemed
mandatory, whereas statutes without such intent and without particular
consequence for noncompliance are directory.142
Noting that the “language issuing a procedural command to a
government official is presumed to indicate an intent that the statute is
directory,” the court then inquired if the directory presumption is overcome
by “negative language prohibiting further action in the case of
noncompliance,” or by threatened injury under a directory reading to “the
right the provision is designed to protect” (here, a defendant’s right to a
fair trial).143 Finding neither condition met in the language of section 30,
the court declined to read the requirements of the Act as mandatory.144
Regarding the defendant’s right to a fair trial, the court stated: “[a]lthough
a recording of defendant’s traffic stop could have provided objective
evidence and assisted the truth-seeking process, it was not indispensable to
a fair trial, particularly where there was no discovery violation or
indication of bad-faith action by the police or the prosecution.”145
In explanation of the stark contrast to Kladis only two years earlier, the
court stressed the distinction between failure to preserve evidence under
the State’s control (Kladis) and failure to collect evidence (Borys).146
While the first presented a discovery violation independent of section 30,
the facts in Borys depended on a statutory provision granting courts the
authority to take action against noncompliance.147
In sum, the Court of Appeals made it clear that section 30 of the
Illinois State Police Act in its current version lacks teeth; it is a directory
provision without an enforcement component.148 That point was succinctly
made by Justice Hall in her two-paragraph special concurrence: “I write
separately to express my concern that the legislature’s failure to include
mandatory statutory language in section 30(b) of the Act . . . could have
the practical effect of nullifying the legislative purpose underlying the
140

Borys, 995 N.E.2d at 506–07.
Id. (citing People v. Robinson, 838 N.E.2d 930, 935–38 (Ill. 2005)).
142
Id. at 507.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id. at 508.
146
Id. at 505.
147
Id. at 507.
148
See id. (“Section 30 of the Act lacks any negative language prohibiting further action if the
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statute by allowing law enforcement to simply ignore the requirement.”149
Citing Town of Mount Pleasant v. Roberts, Justice Hall continued, stating
that “the requirements of section 30(b) of the Act could be circumvented in
perpetuity if the Department of State Police simply decided not to install
the video camera recording equipment in its patrol vehicles.”150
3. Comparing the South Carolina and Illinois Statutes
A comparison of the South Carolina and Illinois videotaping statutes
reveals the vastly different outcomes that seemingly similar provisions can
produce. Where the South Carolina statute directs in painstaking detail
what must be recorded and what shall be the consequence of
noncompliance, the Illinois statute, when pulled apart, is reduced to a mere
directory provision with no enforcement power. Within Illinois, Kladis and
Borys also illustrate the practical effects of the failure to collect-failure to
preserve division. Whereas Kladis could sanction the failure to preserve a
video based on general discovery rules,151 or sanction for the failure to
make a video in Borys depended on the existence of an enforceable
statute.152
One cannot leave out of the equation the courts interpreting
enforcement issues. The Illinois Court of Appeals in Borys seemed quite
intent on poking holes in the State Police Act. In South Carolina, on the
other hand, we encounter a unique convergence of a highly prescriptive
statute and high courts unusually motivated to enforce the statute to its
fullest and most rigid extent.153 The result is a currently unparalleled line of
cases, ordering suppression or dismissal for even minor or partial
noncompliance.
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See Borys, 995 N.E.2d at 506–07 (declining to impose sanctions on the State in light of the
court’s conclusion that section 30 was directory, not mandatory).
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S.E.2d 879, 881 (S.C. 2007)) (citations omitted) (noting that South Carolina appellate courts have
strictly construed the requirements of section 56-5-2953 and have sanctioned the State when their law
enforcement officers fail to meet such requirements); see also State v. Sawyer, Appellate Case No.
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C. Judicial Enforcement Without a Recording Statute
At this point in time, the great majority of states do not have a
videotaping statute. What power do courts in those states have to address
issues with video recordings? The Tennessee Supreme Court gives us an
illustration in State v. Merriman.154
Tennessee rejects the strict bad faith test of Youngblood and instead
requires a trial court to determine whether a trial, conducted without the
lost or destroyed evidence, would be fundamentally unfair.155 If the State
failed in its duty to preserve material evidence, the trial court must
consider: “(1) [t]he degree of negligence involved; (2) [t]he significance of
the destroyed evidence, considered in light of the probative value and
reliability of secondary or substitute evidence that remains available; and
(3) [t]he sufficiency of the other evidence used at trial to support the
conviction.”156
Angela Merriman was charged with DUI and reckless driving.157 She
refused to take a blood alcohol test.158 For reasons unknown, the State was
unable to locate the video recording of her arrest.159 Applying the factors
above, the trial court found that it would be fundamentally unfair to require
the defendant to go to trial without the video and it dismissed the
charges.160
The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal.161
The court first determined that the loss of the video resulted from simple
negligence, and then considered the significance of the recording and the
sufficiency of the remaining evidence.162 According to the Tennessee
Supreme Court, the video “was significant because it recorded [the
defendant’s] conduct, which provided the factual basis for her charges.”163
The court also noted that “the video recording was the only nontestimonial evidence,” because no breath test results were available.164
Balancing these factors, the Tennessee Supreme Court found that the
defendant was deprived of her right to a fair trial.165
Merriman proves that state courts can be powerful enforcers of video
preservation if they choose. Even without a recording statute, courts can
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use state and common law on lost evidence to sanction the State for
mishandling videos. It bears repeating that these courts are limited to
instances where an existing video was lost or destroyed but cannot force
police to make videos: “The State had no duty to create a video recording
of Ms. Merriman’s traffic stop. When the video was recorded, however, it
became part of the State’s evidence against Ms. Merriman and its
disclosure was required.”166
D. Internal Police Regulations
Since the Albuquerque Police Department issued the standard
operating procedure in May 2012, every A.P.D. officer is required to make
a video of every citizen encounter on his or her A.P.D. issued camera.167 It
follows that every officer who does not make a video acts in violation of
this procedure.168 But what does this mean?
Every rule is only as good as its enforcement. What is the consequence
of an officer’s failure to make a recording? If there is a consequence at all,
who can impose it and on whom should it be imposed? Is it solely a matter
for internal officer discipline through the police department, or can a trial
court sanction the State for an officer’s violation of a police standard
operating procedure?
Standard operating procedures are the internal rules and procedures set
out by an agency for the agency, to be amended at the discretion of the
agency.169 They are not laws enacted by a legislative body. They are not
rules adopted by the state supreme court. As a result, they possess no
binding authority in criminal courts. From the defense perspective, the
dilemma is glaring: if trial courts cannot—and the police will not—enforce
compliance, police regulations become meaningless.
1. Considering Police Regulations to Determine Bad Faith
While recording regulations are not binding authority, an argument can
be made that trial judges may very well consider them under the general
law on lost and uncollected evidence.
Turning back to Youngblood and its progeny of bad faith jurisdictions,
courts have significant discretion in deciding what makes the requisite
166
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170

“intent to deprive the defense of information.” Sporadic errors in making
or preserving videos, spread out over time, should never meet the bad faith
standard without anything further. A court may, however, take a different
view when there is a pervasive pattern of not producing videos. Continued
failure by an officer (or a whole agency) to make or preserve recordings in
violation of a regulation, without plausible explanation of why the
investigations could not be recorded, could be reasonably interpreted as
intent to prejudice the defense and may thus allow the trial judge to find
bad faith.
The Ohio Court of Appeals, in State v. Durnwald,171 demonstrates just
how effectively courts can employ police regulations.172 Ohio follows
Youngblood in reasoning that “[t]he failure to preserve evidence that by its
nature or subject is merely potentially useful violates a defendant’s due
process rights only if the police or prosecution acted in bad faith.”173
Defining bad faith, the Court of Appeals stated, “‘bad faith’ generally
implies something more than bad judgment or negligence. ‘It imports a
dishonest purpose, moral obliquity, conscious wrongdoing, breach of a
known duty through some ulterior motive or ill will partaking of the nature
of fraud.’”174 In Durnwald, the videotape containing the defendant’s
investigation was destroyed when cadets in training were left unattended in
the trooper’s unit and recorded over it.175 Taking into consideration the
many similar cases across the states with various scenarios of unintended
tape erasure, surely this type of accident must qualify as mere “bad
judgment or negligence” rather than bad faith?176 Not according to the
Ohio Court of Appeals. The court began by explaining that Ohio State
Highway Patrol policy regulations now require troopers to video record all
traffic stops and preserve videotapes as evidence until all criminal and civil
proceedings have been completed.177 Then, turning to the facts at hand, the
court issued the following harsh words:
[T]he erasure occurred due to the trooper’s complete and
utter failure to safeguard evidence relevant to a crime and
arrest. In view of the obvious ease in simply removing the
videotape after an evening’s shift and the Highway Patrol’s
own regulation requiring preservation of this evidence, the
failure to protect and preserve the videotape under these
170
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circumstances encompasses more than mere negligence or an
error in judgment. In our view, such a continuing cavalier
attitude toward the preservation of DUI videotape evidence
rises to the level of bad faith.178
The tone of the opinion suggests that the court’s frustration with this issue
must have been mounting for some time (“this court finds it incredible that
such ‘accidental’ erasures continue to occur”),179 but the Ohio courts
probably considered their hands tied by Youngblood and the bad faith
standard. Continuous violation of the police agency’s own regulation
supplied the vehicle for elevating the trooper’s level of culpability beyond
mere negligence and over the bad faith hurdle.180
V. LOST EVIDENCE AND RECORDING ISSUES IN CONNECTICUT
The Connecticut Supreme Court declined to limit itself to
Youngblood’s litmus test of bad faith in State v. Morales,181 explaining that
“[t]he due process clause of the Connecticut constitution shares but is not
limited by the content of its federal counterpart.”182 Expressing concern
with Youngblood’s simplistic bad faith standard, the court stated that
“[f]airness dictates that when a person’s liberty is at stake, the sole fact of
whether the police or another state official acted in good or bad faith in
failing to preserve evidence cannot be determinative of whether the
criminal defendant has received due process of law.”183 Instead,
Connecticut continues to apply its pre-Youngblood balancing test,
established in State v. Asherman.184 Under the Asherman test, trial courts
must weigh “the reasons for the unavailability of the evidence against the
degree of prejudice to the accused.”185 In order to balance the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the missing evidence, courts must consider “[1]
the materiality of the missing evidence, [2] the likelihood of mistaken
interpretation of it by witnesses or the jury, [3] the reason for its
nonavailability to the defense[,] and [4] the prejudice to the defendant
caused by the unavailability of the evidence.”186
This rather liberal test might appear like the ideal breeding ground for
178
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some interesting lost-evidence case law in the area of police videotaping.
Yet, at the time of this Essay, issues of police officers recording their
investigations in the field with dashboard or body cameras are virtually
nonexistent in Connecticut jurisprudence, even though dashboard and other
small cameras are coming into common use in Connecticut police
departments187 and some Connecticut police departments are purchasing
body cameras for their officers.188 The author can only speculate as to
whether these officers never lose a video, or if Connecticut attorneys have
yet to litigate lost video cases in the higher courts. While the Connecticut
Appellate Court is as yet unconcerned by questions surrounding
videotaping in the field, the Connecticut Supreme Court has grappled with
the issue of recording custodial interrogations. In State v. Lockhart,189 the
court rejected the defendant’s claim that the Connecticut Constitution
imposes a recording requirement for police interrogations.190 That holding
was to be expected; out of all states’ high courts, only the Alaska Supreme
Court has concluded that electronic recording is mandated by the due
process clause of the Alaska Constitution.191 More noteworthy than the
majority opinion, however, is Justice Palmer’s concurrence. In a lengthy
and enthusiastic opinion, Justice Palmer urged the court to adopt a
recording requirement under its supervisory powers, citing a long history
of false confessions and refuting each of the majority’s arguments against
such a requirement.192
An interesting dichotomy exists in Connecticut between the coverage
of recordings of as opposed to recordings by police. Numerous incidents of
Connecticut citizens recording police officers in the exercise of the
officers’ duties, sometimes at the peril of getting arrested themselves, have
sparked widespread coverage of the citizen’s right to record law
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enforcement. Most notoriously, the arrest of Roman Catholic priest
James Manship by two East Haven police officers made the news in
2009.194 Father Manship was videotaping the arrest of a Latino man inside
an East Haven store; the officers claimed in the police report not to know
what the silver object in Father Manship’s hand was, but the dialogue on
the priest’s recording left no doubt that the officers understood it was a
camera.195 Thanks in part to the priest’s video recording, the officers were
convicted of federal civil rights violations and are serving prison
sentences.196
So, the people of Connecticut have a healthy appreciation for their
right to record police. Given that they are conscious of the advantages of
creating permanent video evidence, perhaps it is only a matter of time until
Connecticut’s residents demand that all officers video-record their
investigations; that is, until Connecticut demands recordings by the police,
not merely secures the right to make recordings of police.197
VI. CONCLUSION
There is something almost amusing about the early case law on lost
police videos. The tone of the various opinions addressing the issue
suggests that courts viewed these videos as quaint, relatively insignificant
pieces of evidence, and their treatment of instances where officers
mishandled videos reflected this view. Gradually, within this past decade,
there has been a noticeable shift away from the nonchalance of the early
1990s. It is difficult to pinpoint what brought on the change. Was it a rising
demand for police accountability? Has a new tech-savvy generation
infiltrated our legislatures and appellate courts, bringing along new ideas
of what should be expected of our law enforcement agencies? Perhaps the
193
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staggering number of wrongful convictions created a new appreciation for
all types of “objective” evidence. In any event, a growing number of states
are now using a combination of statutes and case law to force law
enforcement to make and preserve videos. These states are still a minority
and most states, like Connecticut, have yet to tackle the issue. Considering,
though, how many of the cases and statutes discussed in this Essay stem
from the past five years, this trend towards stricter recording guidelines
will more than likely continue to evolve in the very near future.

